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HIROSH! AOYAMA 
Tokai Industrial College 
Barwise and Etchemendy, whom we will call B&E' in what follows, 
have recently presented a novel solution to the Liar paradox in their very 
attractive book The Liar: An Essay in Truth and Circularity.1 Their solution 
Is given In the theory of truth which they have developed using Austin's 
account of truth.2 Their theory of truth is well developed both 
philosophically and technically. In this paper, we will first look at the 
philosophical aspect of their theory of truth and then give some criticisms 
of it 
1. Philosophical Aspect of B&E's Theory of Truth 
1.1 The bearers of truth 
Before discussing their solution to the Liar paradox, they make 
decisions on certain important matters related to the paradox. The most 
important decision is on what are the primary bearers of truth. B&E say 
that propositions are the primary bearers of truth. What a sentence like "I 
hit the policeman" expresses is highly dependent on the contexts or 
situations in which it is used. One does not know whether or not what it 
expresses is true at least until he knows such contexts or situations. 
Therefore, assigning truth values to sentences does not make sense. They 
should be assigned to what the sentences express in the contexts in which 
they are used, i.e., to the propositions they express. B&E then consider the 
distinction between statements and propositions. They say, 
By a statement we will understand certain sorts of datable events, 
those where a speaker asserts or attempts to assert something 
using a declarative sentence. In contrast, we take a proposition to 
'This is a revised version of a chapter of my Ph.D. thesis, This is the Title of 
this Thesis, submitted to the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign In 
May, 1988. I am very grateful to my thesis adviser, Professor Timothy 
McCarthy, for his invaluable help. I am also very grateful to Professor Jon 
Barwise. Before the publication of Barwise and Etchemendy (1987), he 
sent me a draft of the book. He also gave me some important comments 
on the first draft of that chapter of my thesis. 
2lt appears in Austin (1950). Austin, John L. Truth." Proceedings of the 
Aristotelian Society, supp. vol. xxiv. 
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be a claim about the world, the kind of thing that is asserted by a 
successful statement.3 
The two statements "I am tired" uttered by me and "Hiroshi is tired" 
uttered by a friend of mine express the same proposition. Statements may 
fail to have truth values because of the failure of the presuppositions they 
involve but propositions cannot because they are the claims made by 
statements whose presuppositions are fulfilled. Thus, for example, the 
sentence "The present king of France is crazy" uttered by me now is a 
statement but cannot express a proposition because the present king of 
France does not exist now. Then B&E make a very important decision on 
propositions. They say that there are only two possibilities about a 
proposition; that is, it is either true or not true and its being not true is just 
its being false. So, the principle of bivalence holds for propositions, but not 
for sentences or statements. 
Because they take propositions to be the primary bearers of truth, 
they discard the sentential version of the Liar sentence "This sentence is 
not true " They instead use the prepositional version of it This proposition 
is not true" throughout their book where the phrase This proposition' is 
intended to refer to the proposition, if any, expressed by the whole 
sentence containing it. However, the question here is whether or not there 
really exists any proposition expressed by the Liar sentence. B&E simply 
assume, with no real explanation, that the Liar sentence does express a 
proposition, which they call the 'Liar proposition.' Moreover, they think 
that there is nothing wrong with sentences which refer to the very 
propositions they express. Thus, as with the Liar sentence, the phrase This 
proposition* in the Truth-teller sentence This proposition Is true" refers to 
the proposition expressed by the Truth-teller sentence itself. Similarly, for 
the phrase 'this proposition' in the sentence "Max believes this 
proposition." 
12 Modelling propositions 
B&E present a formal language L in which Liar-like sentences can be 
expressed and then present its semantics. The Liar-like sentences are 
interpreted as propositions in the semantics. Although we do not go into 
the technical side of their truth theory, we mention one technical point: 
their semantics is based not on the ordinary ZFC set theory but on a new 
set theory, which they call, ZFC/AFA.4 B&E want propositions to be 
3Barwise, J. and Etchemendy ] . The Liar: An Essay in Truth and 
Circularity. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987. p. 11. 
4"ZFC" stands for the Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory with the Axiom of 
Choice. It has several axioms like the Axiom of Power Set, the Axiom of 
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modelled as sets in the universe of ZFC/AFA and the Liar proposition to 
be modelled as a set containing itself as a member. They need a set 
theory different from ZFC in which sets containing themselves as 
members cannot be expressed. ZFC/AFA does the required job right. 
To model propositions in ZFC/AFA, B&E first use Russell's account of 
truth. However, they then abandon the Russellian propositions for certain 
reasons and take up Austin's account of truth. They explain it as follows: 
a legitimate statement A provides two things: a historical (or 
actual) situation S A , and a type of situation TA . . The former is just 
some limited portion of the real world; the speaker refers to it 
using what Austin calls "demonstrative conventions." The latter 
is, roughly speaking, a property of situations determined from the 
statement by means of "descriptive conventions" associated with 
the language. The statement A is true if S A is of type T A ; 
otherwise it is false.5 
B&Es idea of truth basically agrees with Austin's account of truth. As 
can be seen from this quotation, Austin takes statements to be the bearers 
of truth. However, since B&E take propositions to be the bearers of truth, 
they say that the proposition p expressed by a statement A is true if the 
historical situation p is about (About(p)) is of the type of situation (Type(p)) 
associated with the statement A by the descriptive conventions. They also 
regard a proposition p as the claim that About(p) is of type Type(p), which 
they write p=(About(p); Type(p)). Concerning the demonstrative 
conventions, they say, "The demonstrative conventions require that a 
statement be about a situation, and situations are portions of the world."6 
On the other hand, they say, The descriptive conventions give us types of 
Replacement, and so on. For the detail of this set theory, consult any 
standard textbook of set theory. 'AFA' stands for (Aczel's) /Inti-Foundation 
Axiom. In order to state AFA, we heed a few definitions. The following are 
from B&E (1987), pp. 39-40, Ch. 3. A graph is a set of nodes and directed 
edges. If there is an edge x->y from node x to node y, then y is said to be a 
child of x. A node with no arrow starting from it is said to be childless. A 
tagged graph is a graph in which each childless node x is tagged by an 
object tag(x), which is either an atom (unrelement) or the empty set. A 
decoration for a tagged graph is a function D defined on the nodes of the 
graph such that for each node x, if x has no children, then D(x)=tag(x); 
otherwise D(x)=D(y): y is a child of x. Given these definitions, we can state 
AFA. It asserts that every tagged graph has a unique decoration. 
5B&& (1987), pp. 28-29, Ch. 2. 
6B&&(1987),p.30,Ch.2. 
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situations, and these types are themselves much like Russellian 
propositions."7 A Russellian proposition, in the simplest case, consists of 
two things: one object and one property, and it makes the claim that the 
object has the property. For example, a statement made with the sentence 
Tom has a cat" will express a proposition claiming that Tom has the 
property having a cat. 
As for a solution to the Liar paradox, B&E claim that the Liar 
proposition can be either true in a situation or false in another; that is, its 
truth depends upon situations. This somewhat strange claim is a result of 
their formal modelling of Austinian propositions. They, however, then 
introduce the notion of an actual situation and claim that the Liar 
proposition is false in an actual situation; this is their solution to the Liar 
paradox.8 The technical formulation of this solution seems to prevent it 
from yielding contradictions. 
In the next section, we will discuss not their solution to the paradox but 
rather some of the hypotheses behind it. 
2. Some Discussions of B&E*s Theory of Truth 
2.1 Propositions as the primary bearers of truth 
We agree with B&E that it does not make sense to assign truth values 
to sentences. The possible truth value of the sentence MI hit the 
policeman" depends on who T and 'the policeman* refer to. In order to 
determine its truth value we have to know the situation or context that the 
sentence is about. Such a situation determines what the sentence 
expresses, i.e., the proposition it expresses. Thus it is more reasonable to 
assign truth values to the propositions sentences express. We also think 
that B&E's distinction between a proposition and a statement is 
reasonable. We then agree with them that statements can fail to express 
propositions and that they fail to have truth values unless they express 
propositions. Thus we think, as B&E do, that propositions are the primary 
7B&E,(1987),p.30,Ch.Z 
^Technically speaking, a situation is a set of states of affairs which they also 
call 'facts' and which can be written as, e.g., <H, Claire, A? ; 1> and <H, 
Claire, AV; 0>; the former corresponds to the fact that Claire has the ace of 
hearts and the latter to the fact that Claire does not have it A situation s is 
actual in a model M of the world if s is a subset of M, where a model of the 
world is a collection of states of affairs. For more, see B&E (1987), p. 131, 
Ch.9. 
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bearers of truth.9 Statements and sentences may be said to have truth 
values in a derivative way, i.e., if they can express propositions; or they may 
be said to inherit their truth values, if any, from the propositions they 
express. We also agree with them that every proposition is either true or 
false (i.e., not true); that is, the principle of bivalence holds for 
propositions.10 
In what follows, we take as the Liar sentence "This proposition is false" 
instead of "This sentence is false."11 
21 On circular (or, self-referential) propositions 
It is certainly true that the term 'this* in a sentence can refer to the 
very sentence. Sentences like "This is an English sentence" and "This is 
not italicized" are perfectly understandable sentences when the 
demonstrative This' is taken to refer to the whole sentence in which it 
occurs. Sentences are physically expressed, orally or visually. As such, it is 
easy to identify them. However, if the term 'this' is used to refer to the 
proposition, if any, expressed by a sentence or statement in which it 
occurs, the identification of the proposition is sometimes very difficult or 
even impossible. Suppose now that 1 uttered the following sentence: 
(1) I know this, 
where the demonstrative 'this' is intended to refer to the proposition, if 
any, expressed by the sentence (1); that is, (1) may be rewritten as "I know 
the proposition expressed by this very sentence." Now, the question is 
whether or not (1) expresses a proposition. Let us check to see if (1) 
expresses a proposition. The phrase 'I know' is just an indicator of one's 
knowledge.12 As such, It does not express any proposition until some 
proposition or some phrase referring to a proposition is attached to it. 
9In other words, truth (and falsity) is a property of propositions. Truth 
values here mean True and False, not including a third truth value like 
Undefined. 
I0Someone might claim that some propositions can be neither true nor 
false. To examine such a claim, we need to consider various sentences and 
the propositions they express. We, however, will not do so in this paper. 
1 1 We also regard "This proposition is not true" as (a version of) the Liar 
sentence. However, we do not regard "This statement is false" or "This 
statement is not true" as the Liar sentence since statements as well as 
sentences are not the primary bearers of truth. 
12Although there are other usages of the phrase 'I know,' we consider only 
this usage here. 
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express a proposition only when the demonstrative 'this' in it successfully 
refers to a proposition. But we have been assuming that it refers to the 
proposition, if any, expressed by (1). So, we have again to check to see if (1) 
expresses a proposition. This process of checking will go on forever 
without reaching an end; it is a vicious circle. The upshot of this Is that (1) 
does not express a proposition.13 
There seem to be many other sentences similar to (1) which do not 
express propositions. We mention a few: T believe this," "I understand 
this," T hope this," T can prove this," 1 forgot this," and T corrected this."14 
The next question is whether or not there is any proposition like the 
Liar proposition expressed by the Liar sentence "This proposition is false." 
We think that there is no such proposition. Let us now check to see if the 
Liar sentence expresses a proposition. The phrase 'is false' in the sentence 
has nothing but a function of ascribing falsity to the proposition to which 
the phrase is attached.15 Thus, it cannot express any proposition until it is 
attached to a proposition or a phrase referring to a proposition. In the case 
of the Liar sentence, it is attached to the phrase This proposition.1 So, we 
have to ask which proposition this This proposition' refers to. But this is 
tantamount to asking what proposition, if any, the Liar sentence expresses, 
because it has been assumed that This proposition* refers to the 
proposition, if any, expressed by the Liar sentence. To answer the latter 
question, we again have to ask if the Liar sentence expresses any 
proposition at all. Thus we have come back to the question we started with. 
A vicious circle, again. The upshot of this is of course that the Liar 
sentence does not express any proposition.16 
If we had chosen "This sentence is false" as the Liar sentence, we 
could have easily answered the question "Which sentence does the phrase 
This sentence' in the Liar sentence refer to?" The answer would have been 
"The Liar sentence itself." This is so because sentences, or tokens of 
1 3An analogous observation is made in Ryle (1951). Ryle, Gilbert. 
"Meterologicality." Analysis: Vol. 11 (1951): 61-69. He uses, what he calls, 
the 'namely-rider.' 
1 4In each of these examples, the term 'this' is intended to refer to the 
proposition, if any, expressed by the whole sentence in which it appears. 
The reader is asked to check these sentences to see how absurd they are. 
In the last sentence, the past tense of the verb seems to be important. 
15Remember that truth and falsity are properties of propositions (see note 
9). 
1 6We can of course get the same conclusion using Ryle's 'namely-rider.' 
Although B&E think in their book that both the Liar sentence and the 
Truth-teller sentence express propositions, they do not present any 
substantial argument for that. 
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sentences, have physical appearances, phonetical or visual. As such they 
are easily identifiable. However, propositions do not seem to have such 
physically identifiable appearances, which makes their Identification 
difficult. And the identification of the Liar proposition is virtually 
impossible because of the kind of vicious circularity explained above. We 
think of this as showing that there is no proposition like the Liar 
proposition. If there were such a proposition, we would have to be able to 
explicitly identify it. We may similarly argue that the Truth-teller 
sentence "This proposition is true" does not express any proposition; in 
other words, there is no proposition like the Truth-teller proposition.17 
In the above we found a vicious circle which makes it impossible for us 
to find the referent of the phrase This proposition' in the Liar sentence. 
However, If we assume that the Liar sentence expresses a proposition, i.e., 
the Liar proposition, we will find another vidous circle. Let us assume that 
the Liar sentence expresses the Liar proposition. Then the Liar 
proposition has a truth value. Let us try to determine its truth value. What 
the Liar proposition claims is that it is false. Thus, in order to determine 
the truth of the claim made by the Liar proposition, we have to examine 
whether or not the Liar proposition is false; that is, we again have to 
examine the Liar proposition and determine its truth value. We have 
come back to the original question. This is a vicious circle which is 
different from the one explained above.18 Furthermore, the principle of 
bivalence for propositions leads us to the conclusion (contradiction) that 
the Liar proposition is true if it is false or that it is both true and false. From 
these two points, we again have to abandon the assumption that the Liar 
sentence expresses a proposition. 
We did not use the notion of a situation in the above. We can of 
course relate some situation to the Liar sentence (not to the Liar 
proposition) by saying, "I now state the Liar sentence 'This proposition is 
false"." Let s be the situation in which I just stated the Liar sentence. Then 
the statement which I just now made using the Liar sentence is related to 
s. But bringing s into the problem of the paradox seems to be of no use 
because there seems to be no fact of the matter in and around s which can 
help us determine the truth value of the Liar proposition, if any, expressed 
by the Liar sentence. For this reason, we do not agree with B&E that the 
notion of a situation plays an essential and indispensable role in solving 
the Liar paradox, although we admit that it plays a very important role in it. 
Let us now consider the following pair of sentences in Kripke (1975): 
17As can be seen below, a strengthened Liar paradox arises here. 
18Here we have to realize that there is no empirical fact of the matter 
which can help us determine the truth value of the Liar proposition. 
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(a) Most of Nixon's assertions about Watergate are false, 
(b) Everything Jones says about Watergate is true, 
where (a) was asserted by Jones and (b) by Nixon.19 Suppose s is a situation 
in which (b) is the only assertion by Nixon about Watergate and in which 
Jones asserted (a) and exactly one other statement about Watergate 
which is known to be false as a matter of fact. Then (b) is false and 
therefore (a) is true since (b) is Nixon's sole assertion about Watergate. In 
this situation s, both (a) and (b) make perfectly good sense or express 
propositions and moreover (a) expresses a true proposition and (b) 
expresses a false proposition. However, there are many other situations in 
which the two statements do not make sense or do not express 
propositions. Let s be a situation in which (a) is Jones' sole assertion about 
Watergate and in which (b) is Nixon's sole assertion about Watergate. In 
this situation s, (a) and (b) can be identified with (a) and (fr), respectively: 
(a) The statement (b) by Nixon is false. 
(b) The statement (a) by Jones is true. 
Then we see a vicious circle if we assume that both (a) and (b) express 
propositions in s. Suppose they both express propositions in s. Then they 
have truth values. But the truth value of (a) depends on that of {b), and the 
truth value of (b) depends on that of (a).2 0 There are no facts of the matter 
in and around s which can help us determine the truth values of (a) and 
(b). This vicious circle again suggests that the assumption that both (a) 
and (tr) express propositions is wrong. Moreover, the principle of bivalence 
for propositions leads us to contradictions; if (a) is true then (b) is false and 
thus (a) is false, and if (a) is false then (b) is true and thus (a) is true. So, (a) 
is true iff (a) is false. Similarly, (b) is true iff (M is false. Therefore, by a 
reductio argument, we have to abandon the assumption that both (a) and 
19Kripke (1975). Kripke,Saul. "Outline of a Theory of Truth." The Journal 
of Philosophy. Vol. 72 (1975): 690-716. p. 691. B&E also say that the 
sentence This proposition is expressible in English using fewer than 
twelve words" makes sense and expresses a proposition. But we do not 
think so. If the phrase This proposition' is replaced by This sentence,' 
then the resulting sentence will make sense and express a proposition. 
Again the problem here is the vicious circularity of the referent of the 
phrase This proposition' in the original sentence. 
2 0The phrase The statement (by in (a) refers to (the statement made by 
the sentence) (b) and similarly the phrase The statement (a)' in (b) refers 
to (the statement made by the sentence) (a). So, there seems to be no 
problem of a vicious circularity of the referent of each of the two phrases. 
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(6) express propositions in s, because we do not abandon the principle of 
bivalence for propositions. Thus we claim that neither (a) nor (Jb) expresses 
a proposition in s, i.e., that neither (a) nor (b) expresses a proposition in s.21 
The above argument shows that the same sentence may express a 
proposition in one situation and may not in another. There are of course 
many such sentences. For example. The present king of France is crazy" 
does not express a proposition in any situation In the year 1987. But it 
expresses a proposition in some situation in the year, say, 1700 and is 
either true or false in the situation. 
In sum, we claim that the Liar sentence does not express any 
proposition in any situation. This is our solution to the Liar paradox. 
However, this simple solution needs a bit of complication because it can 
yield a version of the Strengthened Liar paradox.2' We consider this new 
paradox at the end of this paper. 
13 Situations and states of affairs 
B&E say that an Austinian proposition p consists of two elements. 
About(p) and Type(p), and that p is the claim that About(p) is of type 
Type(p). They also say that About(p) is a subset of the class of states of 
affairs, or facts, and that About(p) is the situation p is about.23 However, it 
is not at all clear which facts should be or should not be included in 
About(p). Imagine the following situation s: 
Max is playing a card game with Claire in his home in Chicago. 
Max has the three of clubs. A cat named Kay is playing with a toy 
mouse beside the card players. Max's father is shouting to Max 
from downstairs that someone is calling him from Boston. Then 
Max says to Claire, "I don't have the three of dubs."24 
2 1 We cannot claim of (a) and (&) that one expresses a proposition but that 
the other does not. Suppose, e.g., that (a) expresses a proposition but that 
(b) does not. Then (a) is either true or false. If it is true, then (6) is false; 
thus it must express a proposition, which is a contradiction. Similarly for 
the case where (a) is false. 
^Professor McCarthy first pointed it out to me with a specific paradoxical 
sentence which is not exactly the same as the sentence Si in Section 3. 
Professor Barwise also pointed it out to me. 
^For the notions of a state of affairs and of a fact, see note 8. 
2 4In this s, there are many urelements like 'Kay' and 'Boston' which are not 
included in the Austinian semantics. But it is not essential since we can 
add those urelements to it. 
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Now the proposition p that Max does not have the three of clubs, 
expressed by Max's statement above, seems to be about s, i.e., About(p)=s. 
Then the question is which facts s contains. It seems clear that s contains 
the fact that Max has the three of clubs. How about the fact that Kay is 
playing with a toy mouse? Does it also contain the fact that someone, say 
Tom, is calling Max from Boston? Does it also contain, e.g., the fact that 
Tom is eating popcorn while calling Max? Where should we stop? Or, are 
all these facts irrelevant except the one that Max has the three of clubs? 
Although this last fact is important to the (truth of the) proposition p, other 
facts in s are equally important as constituents of s. If B&E cannot specify 
which facts are or are not in s=About(p), About(p) does not seem to be 
well-defined as a set in the universe of AFC/AFA, which seems to damage 
their account of the Austinian semantics as well as that of the Austinian 
propositions. 
Furthermore, although About(q) for an empirical proposition q like 
the above proposition p is not so difficult to understand in spite of the 
vagueness of its contents which we just discussed above, About(r) for an 
abstract proposition r is very difficult to understand. If someone states 
that beauty is the opposite of ugliness, what is the situation that the 
proposition expressed by this statement is about? How about the 
situation, if any, that a mathematical proposition like 2+2=4 is about? 
Abstract propositions do not seem to be related to any particular or 
concrete situations. The concept of a situation does not seem to fit 
abstract propositions or statements. In this sense, the Austinian semantics 
in which the notion of a situation plays an indispensable role seems to be 
incapable of handling abstract propositions, or at least needs some 
modification or extension. 
3. McCarthy's Paradox 
First, we assume that every sentence either expresses a proposition or 
does not express a proposition, but not both, and that every sentence 
expressing a proposition, and only such a sentence, is either true or false, 
but not both. The latter agrees with what we said about sentences in the 
previous section.25 Let us consider this sentence Sj: 
S]: Either S t expresses a false proposition or S] does not 
express a proposition.26 
25See pp. 4-5 of this paper. 
26That a sentence expresses a proposition depends on situations in which 
the sentence is used. Thus, strictly speaking, the sentence must instead 
be expressed as: 
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Now Si is paradoxical as seen below. This is a strengthened Liar paradox, 
which we call 'McCarthy's paradox.'27 
(i) S] expresses a prop, o S^  Is true o Si Is false. 
(or) 
Si is false o Si is true. 
(ii) S} does not express a prop, o S t Is true. 
What (i) says, e.g., is this: Suppose S t expresses a proposition. Then Si is 
either true or false. If Si is true, then what S] claims is the case. Since we 
are assuming that Si expresses a proposition, the second disjunct of Si is 
not the case. So, the first disjunct of Si must be the case, which means that 
Si is false. A contradiction. Similarly, if S] is false, then we get a 
contradiction. Similarly for (11). 
McCarthy's paradox seems to show, as a reductio argument, that at 
least one of the two assumptions stated at the beginning of this section is 
wrong. Since we keep the latter assumption in this paper, we take it that 
the assumption that every sentence either expresses a proposition or does 
not express a proposition (but, not both) is wrong. In other words, the 
predicate 'expressing a proposition' is not totally defined, or it is undefined 
for a sentence like S i 2 8 This is our solution to McCarthy's paradox. 
S]: Either Si expresses a false proposition in some situation or Si does 
not express any proposition in any situation. 
We, however, do not use the above version of Si here for simplicity's sake. 
In this section, we do not take situations into consideration. 
z^ To get McCarthy's paradox, strictly speaking, the two assumptions stated 
at the beginning of this section are not enough. We also need Tarski's 
biconditionals and the principle of bivalence for propositions. We also 
need to assume that every sentence expressing a proposition expresses a 
unique proposition. We may assume this last assumption because in this 
section we disregard the notion of a situation when we consider 
propositions (see note 26 above). Two different situations can make one 
and the same sentence express two different propositions with possibly two 
different truth values. However, because of our disregard of situations, 
one single sentence can express at most one proposition. 
2 8ln other words, Si cannot be in either the extension or the antiextension 
of the predicate 'expressing a proposition.' 
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Let us call sentences like S] 'indeterminate] . ' 2 9 That is, they are 
indeterminate as to expressing propositions. Let us now assume that for 
each sentence A, exactly one of the three holds: (1) A expresses a 
proposition, (2) A does not express a proposition, and (3) A is 
indeterminate!.30 Then we get another paradox, which we call the 
'Strengthened McCarthy's paradox,' generated by the following sentence 
S* 
S2: Either Sj expresses a false proposition, or S2 does not 
express a proposition, or S2 is indeterminate]. 
If S2 expresses a proposition,then it Is either true or false; if it is true then it 
is false by the first disjunct of S2 and if it is false then it is true again by the 
first disjunct of S2. If S2 does not express a proposition, then it expresses a 
true proposition by the second disjunct of S* If S2 is indetermlnatei, then 
it again expresses a true proposition by the last disjunct of S2. In any case, 
we get a contradiction. However, this again seems to show the 
incorrectness of the assumption that for each sentence A, exactly one of 
the three holds: (1) A expresses a proposition, (2) A does not express a 
proposition, and (3) A is indetermlnatei. There is at least one sentence 
which does not satisfy this assumption. Let us call such a sentence 
'indeterminate2.' S2 is indeterminate^. We, however, cannot assume that 
for each sentence A, exactly one of the four holds: (1) A expresses a 
proposition, (2) A does not express a proposition, (3) A is indetermlnatei, 
and (4) A is indeterminate^ If we assume this, we will get a Strengthened 
Strengthened McCarthy's paradox. 
In general, we may define an infinite sequence of sentences S], S3, 
Sh, ... as follows: 
Sj: Either S] expresses a false proposition or S] does not express a 
proposition. 
S2: Either S2 expresses a false proposition or S2 does not express a 
proposition, or S2 is indeterminate]. 
S3: Either S3 expresses a false proposition or S3 does not express a 
proposition, or S3 is indeterminate], or S3 is indeterminate .^ 
29The subscript '1' is attached to make the arguments below uniform. 
^Besides this assumption, we still hold the second assumption stated at 
the beginning of this section as well as those in note 27 above. We keep 
them throughout this section. 
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S„: Either S„ expresses a false proposition, or % does not express a 
proposition, or S n is indeterminate], or or S n is 
indeterminate,,.]. 
Si can yield McCarthy's paradox. And, for each n22, S n can yield a 
strengthened version of McCarthy's paradox if we assume that for each 
sentence A, exactly one of the n+1 conditions holds: (DA expresses a 
proposition, (2) A does not express a proposition, (3) A is indeterminate], 
and (n+1) A is indeterminate,,.). We, however, understand this to show 
that such assumptions (n£2) are wrong, as we have understood that S] 
shows that the assumption that every sentence either expresses a 
proposition or does not (but not both) is wrong. Although this yields an 
infinite sequence of getting a paradox and solving it, it does not seem 
unreasonable to regard such an infinite process as a whole as a solution to 
all such paradoxes?1 
Let us finally remark that in the above, the fancy predicates like 
'indeterminate]' and 'indeterminate2' and so on are dispensable. For 
example, S2 can be expressed as follows: 
S£ Either S2 expresses a false proposition, or S2 does not express a 
proposition, or S2 has neither the property 'expressing a 
proposition' nor the property 'not expressing a proposition.' 
This version of S2 can produce a version of the Strengthened McCarthy's 
paradox if we assume that for each sentence A, exactly one of the three 
holds: (1) A expresses a proposition, (2) A does not express a proposition, 
(3) A has neither the property 'expressing a proposition' nor the property 
'not expressing a proposition.' This assumption is essentially the same as 
the one given when we discussed the Srengthened McCarthy's paradox. 
As we denied the latter assumption there, we deny the former here. The 
point is that not the predicates 'indeterminate]' (tel) but the above kinds 
3 1Our solution somewhat reminds us of Tarski's hierarchy of infinitely 
many languages in which he solved the Liar paradox(es). Also our solution 
has a good connection with McCarthy (1985). McCarthy, Timothy. 
"Abstraction and Definability in Semantically Closed Structures." Journal 
of Philosophical Logic. Vol. 14 (1985): 255-266. 
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of assumptions are essential to producing and solving strengthened 
McCarthy's paradoxes.32 
4. A Summary 
The most important difference between our position and B&E's is that 
we do not think Liar-like sentences, i.e., sentences involving vicious 
circularity, express propositions, while they do. It is our belief that our 
solution to the Liar paradox, i.e., regarding the Liar sentence as expressing 
no proposition in any situation, is more natural and reasonable than 
B&E's. However, it is one of their great contributions to the problem of the 
Liar paradox that they greatly clarified, using the concept of situation, the 
meanings of sentences involving the notion of truth. Their work has set up 
a new stage of the study of the Liar paradox. 
32When we consider strengthened McCarthy's paradoxes in classical 
formal languages, primitive (not definitional) predicate symbols 
corresponding to 'indeterminate)' (i>l) seem to be needed. 
